| Ryan Pitylak |
Figure 1
Source:
Kozul-Wright and Rayment (2004) Countries whose
main exports are primary commodities have exposure to terms of trade
volatility. Most developing countries
are primary commodities exporters when they first open themselves up to trade;
see Table 5 for details showing that the countries that are primary exporters
are developing countries. The income
elasticity of demand for primary commodities is lower than manufactured
goods. The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis
states that the terms of trade will hurt exporters of primary commodities over
time because exporters will not be able to purchase as many imports. An example of this problem was the price of
corn, which is a primary commodity, in Trade
liberalization must be implemented slowly so that
markets that are exposed to world prices can diversify into different goods or
markets (Winters et al (2004)). The best
way to mitigate the terms of trade concern is to diversify away from exporting
primary commodities. Exporting
manufactured goods has worked well for the East-Asian countries over the past
few years. If price volatility
causes prices to get too expensive, then social safety nets, such as deferred
payments or subsidized inputs, may be provided so that
producers can smooth production, and therefore smooth output. These should only be
considered as short-term solutions because long-term safety nets will
impede incentives. Increased
competition leads to lower prices. Lower
prices, even though they may be volatile, are ultimately better for the consumer. In addition, if there are many suppliers of a
particular good, then consumers are no longer subject to the decisions of a
limited number of suppliers. Those who are just
above the poverty line are net producers of primary commodities, and therefore
are hurt by the fall in primary commodity prices. This can have an adverse effect on absolute
poverty because more people may be below the poverty line than before
trade. However, lower prices of primary
commodities will have a positive effect on the extreme poor because they are
net consumers of primary commodities (Winters et al (2004)). Minimizing
volatility not only requires sound institutions and policies, but it also
requires countries that already have bad policies and institutions to implement
reform carefully. Government purchasing
programs are prime examples of programs that should be
removed. In Sound policies and
institutions can minimize the volatility from trade shocks. Safety nets should be
provided for the poor who are unable to cope with the negative effects
of volatility from trade shocks. Safety
nets, coupled with sound policies and institutions, will insure that
globalization has the opportunity to be pro-poor. Exporting products that have less exposure
to world price fluctuations will also limit the volatility from trade. (2.2) Tariffs and Subsidies Trade is liberalized when tariffs and subsidies are reduced. Negotiations among countries about changing tariffs
and subsidies are slow. No country wants
to be at a competitive disadvantage from lowering its tariffs or subsidies before
its trading partners lower theirs.
Unfortunately, the use of tariffs and subsidies create a suboptimal
situation whereby resources are not used
efficiently. These inefficiencies hurt
the poor. Without free trade,
the developing countries remain too poor.
Trade can be advantageous for all participants because each country
should produce the goods that it has a competitive advantage to produce. A country has a comparative advantage to
produce a good when it can produce the good cheaper than its trading partner
can. When country X (country Y) trades
the goods that it has produced using its comparative advantage with country Y
(country X), both countries gain because each countries is able to consume more
total goods. The Heckscher-Ohlin
theorem predicts that trade will favor the abundant factor because a country
will have a comparative advantage when it produces goods that use the abundant
factor. Goods that are imported use the
scarce factor, according to the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. Therefore, when tariffs reduce the amount of
goods imported in a developing country, consumers in the developing country
have to purchase these goods from domestic sources. These goods will cost more for the consumers,
which can be bad for the poor if the cost of purchasing these goods is larger than
the increased wage from producing these goods.
In addition, according
to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which predicts that an increase in the price
of goods will lead to an increase in the price of the factor used intensively
to produce those goods, the real reward to the scare factor (capital) will decrease
and the real reward to the abundant factor (labor) will increase during free
trade. Therefore, high import tariffs
depress the wages of unskilled laborers because wages do not raise to their free
trade levels. In the short-term,
not all tariffs are bad. Nissanke and
Thorbecke (2005) argues that trade liberalization is the most successful when
export promotion precedes import liberalization. Export promotion occurs when export tariff
rates are set low, when the exchange rate is undervalued, or when the
government provides subsidies to firms that export. This creates an incentive for domestic firms
to produce goods for exportation. The
East Asian countries that followed this approach have had some success. In addition, export promotion allows export
producers to strengthen technological capabilities.
Larger gains to the
people in developing countries would come from lower tariff rates than were
discussed at the Doha WTO talks. Figure 2 shows that the gains from free trade are larger than the
gains from the tariffs and subsidies agreed upon at the Doha WTO talks. The
World Bank estimates that "if trade in industrial and farm products were
fully freed, the one-off gains from reallocating resources more efficiently
could boost income in developing countries by $86 billion by 2015 and pull an
extra 30 million people out of extreme poverty" (Economist (2005d)). An agreement on free trade for services (from
telecoms to legal work) and industrial goods would also lower poverty
dramatically (Economist (2005b)). The
World Bank estimates that the gains from complete tariff reduction across all
countries would result in $200 billion extra income world-wide,
which would pull many people out of extreme poverty (Economist (2005d)). Tariffs should be reduced in both developing and developed countries
(Economist (2005c)). Lower tariffs in
developed countries will decrease poverty in developing countries because a
large proportion of the poor in developing countries are farmers. However, the representatives who participate
in the WTO talks have focused too much attention on lowering tariffs and
cutting subsidies in developed countries.
However, this is not the only problem: lower tariffs and subsidies in developing
countries comprise half of the potential gains that developing countries can
expect from free trade because one-third of trade for a developing country is
with other developing countries (Economist (2005d)). Tariffs and subsidies should
be lowered incrementally to allow markets to adjust. This has been the traditional policy of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). Agreement among
countries for the appropriate tariff and subsidy amounts is difficult to attain.
Over the past year, the WTO has had
several rounds of discussion about how much tariffs and subsidies should be lowered.
Observers of these talks agree that countries have a hard time reaching
agreement (Economist (2005e)). One
problem that makes reaching agreement difficult is that several factions from
both developing and developed countries want protectionism. For example, during the Hong Kong WTO talks,
South Korean rice farmers demonstrated against freer trade in their
markets. The rice farmers are concerned
because they fear that world competition will lower the price of rice. This creates problems for politicians who
would like to negotiate for lower worldwide tariffs and subsidies. Another problem that
makes reaching agreement difficult is that the expected results of the WTO
talks vary widely among countries (Economist (2005e)). The European Union does not want to cut its
farming subsidies (which, despite all of the focus on cutting subsidies, will
only increase the gains from the trade by 2%).
The Americans do not expect to dramatically lower subsidies on cotton. However, most countries agree that subsidies should be cut in the European Union and that subsidies
should be cut further in Unfortunately,
talks among countries have been relatively stagnant despite ongoing
efforts. Finding agreement among
everyone has proven to be very difficult.
Academic and political efforts should be placed
on finding an alternative approach to handling these WTO talks because the
gains that can be made for the poor are enormous. Furthermore, even when countries reach
agreement about lower tariffs and subsidies, many of these countries do not
implement them on time. Emphasis needs
to be placed on mechanisms that would create the
necessary incentives for countries to implement lower tariffs and subsidies on
time. Tariff and subsidy reduction
depend not only on successful negotiations and implementation
but they must also be paired with an anti-dumping policy so that markets are
not undermined. Dumping occurs either
when a foreign firm sells its goods to an international market sold for less
than its production costs, or when the foreign firm sells its goods internationally
for less than the firm sells the goods for in its own
country. The goal of the dumping firm is
to gain market share or hurt competitors.
These actions hurt the natural competitiveness of markets because artificially
low prices from dumping may limit (destroy) the creation (existence) of
long-term competitive firms. Anti-dumping
policies can lead to protectionism, which is when the tariff structure of a country
is set so that consumers favor domestically produced goods over imported goods,
whereas anti-dumping policies are supposed to regulate the activity of dumping,
not discourage goods from being imported (Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough
(2000)). Fortunately, the Uruguay Round
of the WTO talks partially dealt with this problem. If countries want to keep anti-dumping
measures in effect for more than five years, they have to provide evidence to
show that removing the protection would cause undue damage to domestic
companies. This paper is
emphasizing fair trade among all trading countries. Fair trade requires common subsidy and tariff
levels. Fair trade allows countries to
produce and export goods that have a comparative advantage. Fair trade can be regional or global, and Deardorff (2005) finds that countries have a desire to join
PTAs (Preferential Trade Areas), which are regional, when liberalizing trade. This paper is not suggesting that trade zones
are the best solution, because trade zones only benefit the countries that
participate. PTAs are worse than global
fair trade because producers do not produce according to their comparative
advantage because trade diversion, which is when the tariff structure among
countries within a PTA favors goods produced within the PTA, creates an
incentive for consumers to favor goods produced within the PTA. Consumers would be able to consumer more
goods if they could purchase goods produced by producers that have a
comparative advantage. PTAs also favor
trade creation, which allows industries to grow when they might not have
otherwise had a chance to compete in these sectors. Although infant industry protection is
justifiable in the short-term, in the long-term this protection creates a
disincentive for industries to become globally competitive. Until no PTA’s
exist, global fair trade is not possible.
Therefore, with our current global structure of PTA’s, if a country does
not join a Changes in tariffs
and subsidies are hard to enact. The members
of the WTO talks regularly delay these talks and the talks rarely attain
drastic results. Lower tariff and
subsidy levels allow imported goods from developing countries the opportunity
to compete with domestic goods in the developed country. Overall, if all countries lowered tariffs and
subsidies simultaneously, the gains from trade would far outweigh the negative
effects that would occur to industries that are currently producing goods
inefficiently. Over the long-term,
tariffs and subsidies hurt the poor because fair trade can lead to pro-poor
growth. (2.3) Introduction to the Labor Market The poor can have a
hard time gaining from trade liberalization because they are not equipped for
exportation of the goods that they produce.
The wage of the poor will not increase unless the poor can find jobs linked
with the export sector. Trade can lead
to higher prices for certain goods, but trade should lead to an increase in the
real. Assuming labor mobility, trade
should lead to increased real wages for the poor. Labor mobility allows workers to move from
shrinking sectors into expanding sectors over the long-term. Unemployment may arise in the short-term;
however, mixed empirical evidence is available about whether unemployment rises
in the short-term after tariff changes. New sectors can
develop, which can provide new jobs for the poor, after trade liberalized. In In a developing
country, producers will export goods produced that have a comparative
advantage. These goods will use
unskilled labor because unskilled labor is the abundant factor in developing
countries. The prices of the goods
produced with comparative advantage will increase, and therefore, according to
the Stolper-Samuelson, the wages of workers in these sectors will increase. The wages of the workers in the shrinking,
once-protected, industries will decrease.
The consumption effect states that the higher priced goods produced by
unskilled workers will lower the amount of goods that consumers can purchase,
holding income constant. According to
the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the price of the abundant factor increases after
trade. The income effect states that, in
developing countries, the nominal wage of unskilled workers increases because
they are the abundant factor of production.
Goldberg et. al (2004)
write about Jones (1965), who shows with the Heckscher-Ohlin model that over
the long-term the consumption effect is smaller than the income effect, and
therefore, the higher wages and prices in the unskilled labor market is
beneficial for unskilled laborers. In the short-run, when
factors are immobile, trade liberalization will have different effects
depending on the preexisting tariff structure.
In protected sectors that employ unskilled workers, these workers will
face lower wages or higher unemployment after tariff reductions. Unskilled workers are already at the lower
end of the income distribution, and are more likely to be closer to the poverty
line. The reduction of tariffs in these
sectors may have contributed to increased poverty in some countries over the
short-term. Although
unemployment effects should only exist in the short-term, unemployment is
important to study because increased unemployment drags people into
poverty. Therefore, during the
short-term, those who become unemployed need a safety net to protect them from
extreme poverty. Goldberg et al (2004)
explain that that a way to measure the effect of trade policy on unemployment
is to look at the correlation between unemployment levels before and after
tariff reductions. Household surveys
performed by developing countries lack information about what industry the
unemployed used to work in or about what industry they are currently seeking
work in. Goldberg et al (2004) explain
that without transitional unemployment information, it is very difficult to gauge
the impact of tariff reductions on unemployment. In sectors that
have had tariffs reduced, they expected unemployment levels to be worse. However, in Disagreement exists
between Goldberg et al (2004) and Winters et al (2004) about the effect of
trade liberalization on unemployment.
Whereas Goldberg et al (2004) state that there is no correlation between
tariff reduction and unemployment, Winters et al (2004) write that the duration
of unemployment was the longest in sectors that had the largest tariff
reductions. Winters et al (2004) explain
that temporary unemployment may also exist while labor markets adjust to new
prices in the goods market. Trade
liberalization requires tariff and subsidy reduction. Ideally, trade should be a net positive for
the society, and enough money for transfers, in the short-term only, should be
available to make everyone at least no worse off than before trade
liberalization. In the long-term, labor
mobility will allow the unskilled laborers to move into growing sectors and
receive higher real wages. (2.4) Income Inequality Economists
generally view increased income inequality as having a negative impact on the
poor. Narrowing the skill gap between
unskilled and skilled workers will lower income inequality. However, even if trade liberalization increases
income inequality, traditional sector enrichment will have an overall positive
impact on the poor because absolute income relative to the cost of living
increases for unskilled workers during traditional sector enrichment. Heshmati (2004) concludes that increased
trade has a small impact on reducing income inequality. Improved access to
new technology after trade liberalization has increased the marginal
productivity levels of skilled workers.
This has increased their per capita income levels. Inequality will rise unless skilled-biased
businesses create linkages with unskilled-biased businesses because these linkages
can cause the absolute income levels of the poor to rise. One example of a linkage is when a
skilled-biased company demands more goods from an unskilled-biased company. Another example of a
linkage is when a skilled-biased company creates
intermediate inputs that are used by an unskilled biased company. There is dispute
about whether trade liberalization increases or decreases income
inequality. Winters et al (2004)
highlights this dispute by stating that the East Asian countries have
experienced a narrowed gap between skilled laborers and unskilled laborers
after trade liberalization whereas the Latin American countries have
experienced a wider gap between these two labor markets. It is important to try to understand the
difference between these two regions to learn why Until unskilled
workers gain more skills, the income gap between unskilled and skilled wages
increases initially after globalization (Nissanke and Thorbecke (2005), who
write about Agénor (2002)). Policies that focus on upgrading the skills
of unskilled workers promotes modern sector enlargement, which is pro-poor for
those the new skilled workers. The
unskilled workers in (2.5) Unskilled laborers In the long run, an increased demand for unskilled labor in
developing countries from trade will cause poverty to decline. Trade has the ability to move some informal
workers, who typically earn very low wages, into the formal wage market
(Bardhan (2004a), who wrote about Hertel et al
(2003)). In developing countries, trade
will lead to an increased demand for unskilled laborers, which will lead to an
increased wage for these laborers. In
addition, a positive side effect of trade liberalization is increased
compliance with minimum wage requirements (Goldberg et al (2004)). Two opposing
effects affect the real income levels of unskilled workers. The consumption effect lowers real income for
these workers because they have to pay higher prices for unskilled labor goods,
such as food. The income effect raises
real income because these workers are receiving higher wages. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the
income effect is larger than the consumption effect, and therefore, the higher
wages and higher prices are beneficial for unskilled laborers. According to the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which predicts that an increase in the price of
goods will lead to an increase in the price of the factor used intensively to
produce those goods, the real reward to the scare factor (capital) will
decrease and the real reward to the abundant factor (labor) will increase. Therefore, the wages of unskilled laborers
should increase after trade. However, many
unskilled laborers work in the agriculture sector, and therefore, there are counter-effects
from trade, such as the effect of trade on primary commodities, that also
affect the real wage of unskilled laborers. Better fertilizers,
irrigation systems, and other solutions aimed at increasing the marginal
productivity will increase marginal productivity of unskilled workers in the
agricultural sector. The Green
Revolution is an example of a period where the marginal productivity in
agriculture increased in Poor farmers do not
typically gain from productivity improvements in agricultural productivity
because these farmers lack the productive assets to increase their
productivity. Multinational corporations
gain from the improvements in agricultural productivity (Nissanke and Thorbecke
(2005)). Institutions are necessary to
prevent multinational corporations from taking all of the benefit from
productivity improvements because multinational corporations may not share this
extra wealth with the poor. Two successful
globalizers, Safety nets must be provided to farmers so that they can produce their
comparative advantage products. Farmers
will need to move from traditional crops into products such as fruits,
vegetables, flowers, dairy products, and processed foods. In addition to public adjustment services,
farmers may also require storage (which allows farmers to avoid low prices in
the post-harvest season), transportation, infrastructure, laws, and money for
retooling and marketing so that they are not pushed out of business by the
influx of large marketing chains. Overall
evidence suggests that these institutions will be pro-poor. In Sub-Saharan
Africa, the agricultural productivity did not increase. Sindzingre (2005)
states that Sub-Saharan Africa’s agriculture sector was hurt by geographical
constraints (weather), policy (resistance to reform), and institutional factors
(price stabilization schemes, monopsonies, and agricultural marketing boards),
which led to output stagnation.
Agricultural marketing boards have hurt the agriculture sectors in
Sub-Saharan countries such as Without land rights,
farmers will not expend as much energy producing goods. Even worse, when the government takes away
land from farmers, they have to find work elsewhere. These farmers might find work on larger tenants,
but they might earn lower wages. For
example, after the Trade opens up many
avenues for unskilled workers to break away from poverty. The real wages of unskilled workers should
increase after trade. Poor farmers can
receive higher real wages by using better fertilizers, better irrigation
systems, and other solutions that increase their marginal productivity. The poor farmers need access to credit
markets to be able to make the transition away from
producing commodities, to purchase fertilizers, and to gain access to
irrigation systems. (2.6) Skilled laborers: Skilled workers are
better equipped to take advantage of trade.
Those who can find jobs in sectors that export manufacturing goods will
gain the most from trade. Due to
capital-intensive technology transfer, the marginal productivity of workers in
manufacturing sectors is higher, and therefore, they receive higher wages. Winters et al (2004) explain that finding
employment in the formal sector, which includes manufacturing industries that
export, is one of the surest ways to move out of poverty. Table 6 shows the details about Table 6 Distribution of GDP (percentages) Agriculture Industry Services 1965 1989 1994 1965 1989 1994 1965 1989 1994 Low income LDC’s 44 32 28 28 37 34 28 31 36 Others 44 33 38 17 28 21 37 39 39 Low-middle-income LDC’s 21 14 13 30 35 36 48 51 49 Upper-middle-income LDC’s 18 -- 8 38 -- 37 42 -- 53 High-income LDC’s 8 4 -- 45 41 -- 46 54 -- Industrialized countries 5 --
»2 43 --
»30 54 --
»68 Note:
In the 1965 and 1989 data, countries are grouped
according to 1989 per capita GDP. Sources: Bencivenga (2005) from World Development
Reports, World Bank (1991), Table 3 and 1996, Table 12. Trade openness
causes productivity levels to increase (Goldberg et al (2004)). If the increased productivity results in more
profit for the firms, then the industry wages can be
increased, provided these increased profits are shared with the
employees. However, the empirical
evidence is mixed about whether or not industrial
workers see this money. Skill-intensive
intermediate goods may be transferred from less
developed countries to countries that are even less developed to be
manufactured. Kozul-Wright and Rayment (2004)
explains that some Latin American and Sub-Sahara African countries are
experiencing premature deindustrialization, despite the backward and forward
linkages afforded by some industrial sectors, such as metalworking. Premature deindustrialization is when a
country stops producing manufactured goods, even though it may have a competitive
advantage in producing those manufactured goods. Latin American is an example of an
environment that lacked foreign direct investment after the debt crisis in the
late 1990’s. This led to premature
deindustrialization. Table 7 shows details
about the manufacturing output as a share of GDP by region, and emphasizes the
fact that manufacturing in Table 7
Source:
Kozul-Wright and Rayment (2004) Foreign direct
investment can produce skill transfer and technology transfer to domestic
producers (Kozul-Wright and Rayment (2004)).
Skill-based technical change leads to both a higher relative wage for
skilled workers, and an increased share of skilled workers within most
industries (Goldberg et al (2004)). Most
technological change is skilled-based because most research and development
activities occur in developed countries (Nissanke and Thorbecke (2005)). Technological change in developed countries
focuses on decreasing the amount of labor required to perform a specific task
because labor is scarce in developed countries.
Labor is abundant in developing countries, and therefore technological
change that decreases the need for laborers may not have a significantly
positive impact in a developing country.
Firms and sectors
that are able to make the necessary technological advances to become
competitive in the world market will survive the globalization process. Goldberg et al (2004) write about a study performed
by Harrison and Hanson (1999) that shows a positive correlation between the
number of skilled workers in "The
elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to non-farm output growth varies
depending on initial conditions, like literacy or land distribution"
(Bardhan (2004b), who writes about Ravallion and Datt
(2002)). Non-farm growth is more
pro-poor in countries that have lower initial landlessness and higher literacy
rates (Ravallion and Datt (2002)). Higher literacy correlates positively with
higher levels of education because education leads to higher marginal
productivity levels. Landlessness may
decrease the pro-poor impact of non-farm growth because governments where
landlessness is prevalent may not have sound institutions and policies in place
for the poor to take advantage of non-farm growth. The poor need institutions, such as education
and insurance, to prepare for non-farm labor. Exportation from the
manufacturing and services sectors helped the East Asian countries grow in a
pro-poor fashion. This method of
production focus should be replicated in newly
globalizing countries. Globalization
requires a “long-term vision for upgrading a country’s comparative advantages
towards high value added activities by climbing the technology ladder step by
step through learning and adaptation” (Nissanke and Thorbecke (2005)). (2.7) Decreased government revenue: After trade
liberalization, government revenue might go down. Increased government revenue is important,
because government spending can reduce poverty if it the money spent on
productivity enhancing investments, such as research and development,
infrastructure, such as roads and electricity, and development targeted
directed on the poor (Fan et al. (1998)).
However, there appears to be no empirical evidence to support the claim
that decreased government revenue increases poverty (Goldberg et al (2004)). One way to reconcile these seemingly
contradictory positions is to provide short-term redistributions from some of
the net gains from trade (however, not through import, export, or trade taxes)
to the poor. In the long
run, decreased government spending must be replaced with sound
institutions and policies that create a catalyst for moving the poor out of
poverty. However, despite
all the concern about lower government revenue, Winters et al (2004) write
about Ebrill, Stotsky, and Gropp (1999), who found in an empirical study that after
countries reduced their tariffs, they did not have significantly lower
government revenues than countries that did not reduce tariffs. If government revenues do decrease, and the
situation is such that lower revenues will lead to increased poverty, then alternative
non-tariff sources of revenue must compensate for the fall in government
receipts. Replacement taxes should not
be complex so that people will cooperate and so that the administrative
overhead is low; this will create a profit maximization situation. These taxes should be progressive so that the
taxes do not burden the poor. Government spending
is complicated because it can have a pro-poor impact if the government spends
the money on the right programs.
However, because the poor are the least likely to vote, they do not have
enough of a voice to receive ample government expenditures. Winters et al (2004) explains that there is
substantial evidence to support the fact most of the poor do not receive the
benefits of government spending. Therefore,
the impact of globalization on government spending, even though it is
statistically not significant, is not important because the poor are not receiving
the benefits of governments spending anyways. (3) Institutions and Policies After trade
liberalization, institutions and policies that keep people in poverty will only
make matters worse for the poor. Sound institutions
and policies must be created before trade
liberalization and financial liberalization because the impact of globalization
“will depend on the initial conditions at the time of exposure and the
effective design and implementation of policy to manage the integration
process” (Kozul-Wright and Rayment (2004)).
Institutions and policies create a threshold effect for globalization,
which means that institutions and policies have a larger impact than before
globalization. If institutions and
policies are pro-poor (not pro-poor), then these institutions and policies will
affect the poor even more positively (negatively) than before globalization. Defining
institutions is important because many economists use this term loosely. The definition used herein is consistent with
the definition used by Sindzingre (2005), who uses Douglass North’s (1990,
1991) definition. Institutions are
constraints that structure political, economic, and social interactions. Institutions consist of formal regulations
(such as constitutions, laws and property rights), and informal regulations
(such as traditions, conventions, and norms of behavior). Institutions reduce transaction costs,
stabilize volatility, strengthen incentives, properly channel resources, and
deliver flexible responses to uncertainty.
In addition, the causal link between globalization and institutions and
the casual link between globalization and policies is unclear because the
distinction between the isolated effects of institutions and policies is
unclear. (3.1)
Impact of institutions and policies Institutions and
policies create a threshold effect on the causal link between globalization and
poverty (Nissanke and Thorbecke (2005)).
Based on the structure of policies and institutions, the effect of
globalization on the poor can lead to several different outcomes. Globalization can increase or decrease
inequality. Globalization can pull
people out of poverty or it can push people into poverty. The outcome for the poor depends on whether
these institutions can successfully favor collective action of the poor,
prevent collective action or the wealthy, regulate redistribution gains to
ensure that the poor receive redistribution in the short-term and medium-term
when necessary, and regulate insurance mechanisms to ensure that the poor have
access to insurance and credit markets. Sindzingre (2005) states that the effectiveness of an institution to positively affect the poor depends on the structure of human capital, the structure of the political economy, the level of social cohesion, and the relationship of the institution with other institutions. The structure of the political economy is important because social polarization, oligarchic structures, or predatory regimes will mitigate the effectiveness of an institution. The structure of human capital is important because institutions intended to lead to growth might not lead to growth if the population is poorly educated or does not have much technical a |